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Abstract This paper analyses whether the German corporate governance is
converging towards Anglo-American practices. We summarise the extant empirical
evidence on the various governance mechanisms that economic theory suggests
ensure efficiency and describe recent legal developments. We find no clear signs of
convergence in form, i.e. the main distinctive features of the German system have
remained largely unaltered. However, changes occurred over the last decade (spe-
cially in the legal framework) suggest a certain convergence in function, i.e. some
governance mechanisms have effectively incorporated aims and/or goals generally
associated with the Anglo-American model.
Keywords Convergence  Corporate governance  Germany
JEL codes G32  G34  G38
1 Introduction
The German system of corporate governance has traditionally been characterised by
the important role that large shareholders and banks play, a two-tier board structure
with labour participation on the supervisory board of large companies, the absence
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of hostile takeovers, and a legal framework based on statutory regulations deeply
rooted in the German doctrine. Another distinctive feature of the German regime is
the efficiency criterion that corporate governance is to uphold. Whereas in Germany
(as well as in many other Continental European countries and Japan) the definition
of corporate governance explicitly mentions stakeholder value maximization, the
Anglo-American system mostly focuses on generating a fair return for investors.
Because of its idiosyncratic configuration, German corporate governance has
(sometimes rather critically) been labelled ‘‘Deutschland AG’’ or ‘‘Germany Inc.’’.
Recently, Germany has however witnessed a number of financial operations that
do not fit well with this description. We can mention here the initial public offering
of Deutsche Telekom AG, the successful hostile takeover of Mannesmann by
Vodafone, and the cross-border merger between Daimler Benz AG and Chrysler
Corp. The introduction of voluntary regulations such as the Takeover Code of 1995
and the Corporate Governance Code of 2002, however limited, is another major
change. Last but not least, there is evidence that listed German firms are
progressively applying the principle of shareholder value (Tuschke and Sanders
2003). All these events call into question the ‘‘Deutschland AG’’ paradigm. They
have also generated an extensive debate (Krahnen and Schmidt 2004). Hence, the
question that arises is whether the German system of corporate governance has
indeed changed some of its basic features and whether these changes have resulted
in a certain degree of convergence of the German system towards the Anglo-
American, market-centred system (see e.g. McCahery et al. 2002; Gordon and Roe
2004).
This paper aims at answering this question by providing an exhaustive review of
the literature. In detail, we describe the various alternative mechanisms that theory
suggests ensure economic efficiency and summarise the empirical evidence on
Germany. In particular, we examine the role of the control structure, the board,
creditor monitoring, the market for (partial) corporate control, and product market
competition as corporate governance devices. We also discuss changes in the legal
framework. The picture that emerges from our analysis is not substantially
different from ‘‘the stereotypical view of German finance’’ (Jenkinson and
Ljungqvist 2001, p. 397). However, we also find that some of the features that
underlie this view do not exist anymore (e.g. the use of voting caps and multiple
voting shares).
We believe that it is sensible to conclude that the German system of corporate
governance is undergoing a process of transformations. Whether this process will
eventually make the German system converge towards a market-oriented system
remains to be seen. However, it is doubtful that such convergence will ever occur
completely in light of the ‘‘perceived superiority of governmental and/or collective-
corporatist strategies over market-based solutions’’ (Baum 2004, p. 7) and the ‘‘off-
hands approach’’ to corporate governance that is predominant in Germany (Gehrig
2003, p. 661). In any case, to date the existing differences are important enough to
claim that ‘‘the stereotypical view’’ of ‘‘Germany Inc.’’ is still a valid paradigm.
Convergence, if any, seems to have occurred in the function that certain governance
mechanisms perform (e.g. the supervisory board and the remuneration policy); the
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institutional structure of the system (i.e. its form), however, remains largely
unaltered.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
convergence debate. In Sect. 3, we address the characteristics of the internal and
external governance mechanisms in Germany. The recent regulatory changes are
then presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 The convergence debate
Two strands of the literature have preceded the current debate on the convergence of
corporate governance systems. Initially, researchers focused on describing the main
characteristics of the national systems. In particular, the American and later the
German and Japanese cases were deeply investigated. However, comparative
studies went soon beyond studying these countries. Evidence from large interna-
tional data sets revealed that national systems differ greatly along a number of
dimensions (such as the control structure and the importance of capital markets) but,
at the same time, common patterns can be found within this diversity (such as in
terms of the legal framework). These findings made possible a classification of
national systems based on two main models or regimes. In some countries, notably
the USA and the UK, the ownership structure of the firms tends to be dispersed
among a myriad of small shareholders and capital markets are highly developed,
thus providing financing and monitoring. In a nutshell, this is the Anglo-American
or market-centred model of corporate governance. In contrast, in countries such as
Germany and Japan, the role of the stock market in the provision of financing is less
pronounced, banks play a central role in both financing and governance activities,
and most firms have a large, controlling shareholder. This is the bank-centred model
of corporate governance (Barca and Becht 2001; McCahery et al. 2002).1
Once national systems were perfectly characterised and classified, the efficiency
question arose. In the words of Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 739), ‘‘which system is
the best?’’ Some authors declared the superiority of the Anglo-American model
because the continuous exposure to takeovers keeps managerial autonomy under
check. Also, subsequent changes in control enable the acquirer to reallocate the
target’s resources more profitably (Jensen 1993). The downside is that managers in
market-centred systems may behave myopically if they pay too much attention to
the short-term evolution of stock prices. In contrast, a bank-centred system is said to
1 An analogous classification emerges in the ‘‘varieties of capitalism’’ literature which holds that
corporate governance depends on the presence of ‘‘regulatory regimes that are the preserve of the nation
state’’ (Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 4). In particular, Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that
liberal market economies (LMEs) are associated with political systems that tend to concentrate political
power in the executive, whilst coordinated market economies (CMEs) tend to be governed by
consociational, coalitional or quasi-corporatist regimes. In LMEs, coordination is based on market
mechanisms, favouring investment in transferable assets; in CMEs, coordination is by non-market means,
favouring longer term investment in specific assets (see also Soskice 1997; Casper et al. 1999). In
summary, within CMEs, a focus on stakeholder interests is associated with both firm level practices and a
wider governance regime. Within LMEs, certain firm level employment practices are complementary to
an emphasis on shareholder value and a wider political framework.
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provide stability and a long-term growth perspective (Porter 1992). However, this is
at the risk of an excess of protection facilitating management entrenchment and
leading to a misallocation of funds that eventually cause underperformance
(Hellwig 2000). In a survey paper on the economics of mergers and acquisitions,
Burkart (1999) concludes that although managers shielded from the takeover threat
do not necessarily behave like empire-builders they tend to become sluggish. All
thinks considered, each system seems to enjoy certain comparative advantages when
it comes to solving agency problems.2
This analysis of the pros and cons of each model triggered the current
convergence debate (Gordon and Roe 2004). If the observed differences between
national systems and regimes have an impact on corporate efficiency, then one
should expect that market competition would eventually bring about a convergence
between systems. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000) have developed a new line of
research which explains the differences in corporate governance systems by the
level of legal protection minority shareholders enjoy and the degree of capital
market development. They find that common law systems tend to offer better
protection both against the expropriation of shareholders by the management and
the violation of the rights of minority shareholders by large shareholders than civil
law systems. Likewise, creditor protection is strongest in common law countries and
worst in French civil law countries. The Scandinavian and German countries are
somewhere in between. The policy implication of La Porta et al.’s work is that
countries should move towards the more efficient common law system based on
transparency and arm’s length relationships (see, however, Berglo¨f and von
Thadden 2000).
At the limit, this trend will mean ‘‘the end of history for corporate law’’
(Hansmann and Kraakman 2001): after a transitional or adjustment period all
jurisdictions will end up using analogous rules and practices. However, there are
forces acting in the opposite direction (Branson 2001). Bebchuk and Roe (1999)
emphasise that national corporate governance systems tend to show strong
(structure- and rule-driven) path dependence. The reasons are manifold. Some are
purely technical, such as the existence of sunk adaptive costs, complementarities,
and network externalities that may result in multiple equilibria. However, we should
not underestimate the lobbying activities performed by the individuals and
institutions that benefit from the existing structures and may see new developments
as a threat to their interests. These actors will tend to oppose changes even if these
are to promote efficiency. In general, political and historical factors may hamper
convergence (Roe 1994). For example, collective bargaining and co-determination
are key elements of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance, the approach
2 Soskice (1997) and Casper et al. (1999, p. 12) argue that the different comparative advantages of each
corporate governance system result in different innovation patterns. For example, ‘‘bank-centered
financial systems’’ such as the German system ‘‘are ideally suited to incremental innovation patterns’’
which ‘‘generally involve the systematic exploitation of particular technologies to a wide variety of niche
markets’’, as in e.g. machinery, engineering, chemicals, software and biotechnology firms. ‘‘Most [of
these] firms have high capital equipment costs that require long-term, but relatively low-risk financing of
the sort which German banks have traditionally specialized in (…) On the other hand, German
institutional arrangements appear less suited to [radical innovations, i.e.] higher-risk innovation strategies
in many newly emerging technologies’’.
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that has predominated in Germany for decades. This means that any regulatory
attempt to modify the former is likely to be rejected by German politicians if it is
interpreted as an attack on the latter (Baums 2000; Gehrig 2003).
It therefore seems that a necessary condition for convergence is that the expected
gains of a potentially better system outweigh the costs associated with the transition
process; otherwise the original system will persist. However, this may not be a
sufficient condition. Gilson (2001, p. 338) argues that although ‘‘[a] system that
allows poor managers to remain in control will not succeed, (…) [w]e do not
observe formal convergence because each system’s governance institutions have
sufficient flexibility to find a solution within their path dependent limits’’. This is
what he calls functional convergence, i.e. a kind of convergence that occurs ‘‘when
existing governance institutions are flexible enough to respond to the demands of
changed circumstances without altering the institutions’ formal characteristics’’
(see, however, Coffee 2000). Reality can be expected to fall somewhere in between,
thus resulting in a hybrid composition that combines elements of formal
convergence with elements of functional convergence. The EU provides an
illustrative example of these multiple equilibria in corporate governance systems
(Ferrarini et al. 2004; Wo¨jcik 2004).
In Germany, the convergence debate has been fuelled by a host of economic and
legal events that may be interpreted as milestones of a convergence process (Gordon
1999). First, there was the initial public offering of Deutsche Telekom AG (formerly
a division of the Bundespost, a public utility providing telecommunications, postal
and banking services). This was a turning point for shareholder capitalism in
Germany: nearly 2 million Germans subscribed to the offering, which was five
times oversubscribed. More importantly, around half a million of these Germans
had never owned shares before of. Second, the takeover of Mannesmann by
Vodafone was the biggest hostile takeover in German history and only one out of
four hostile takeovers in Germany’s post-war history. In the Mannesmann-Vodafone
case, shareholders (mostly foreigners) and unions (Mannesmann was subject to full-
parity co-determination because its steel and coal businesses) did not follow
management opposition and were eventually supportive of the bid. Last but not
least, there was the cross-border merger between Daimler Benz and Chrysler
Corporation. Although the merged unit listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
Daimler Chrysler is in fact a German corporation. As a result, the company had to
design its corporate governance under German law but also had to follow American
standards on e.g. disclosure and compensation policy. Because of the size and
importance of the merged company (at the time it was the largest cross-border
merger of two industrial corporations), this meant an injection of American-style
business practices into Germany.
At the market level, the statistics have shown a sharp rise in both the number of
shareholders and listed companies since the mid-1990s. There has also been a
remarkable increase in market capitalization. The percentage of the German
population holding stocks in publicly traded corporations practically doubled
between 1988 and 2000, and the ratio of market capitalization to the GDP rose from
19.9% in 1991 to 69.6% in 2000 (Gordon 2004). The initial success of the Neuer
Markt, established by the Deutsche Bo¨rse in 1997 as a competitor to NASDAQ for
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targeting initial public offerings of high tech companies, can also be interpreted as a
step towards a market-centred system. Whereas in 1997 the number of IPOs was
only 11, in 2000 it reached 143 (Goergen et al. 2004). All these figures indicate a
development of German capital markets on both the supply and the demand side far
beyond the anecdotic cases of Deutsche Telekom AG, Mannesmann-Vodafone and
Daimler Chrysler (Nowak 2001).
Perhaps the clearest sign that something is changing in German corporate
governance is the mere fact that some of its cornerstones are currently being
debated. Critical features such as the co-determination system and the structure of
boards, to name just two examples, are under scrutiny (Baum 2004; Hopt and
Leyens 2004). Admittedly, so far the debate has been rather cautious. Yet it is
significant that governance practices that had never been called into question over
several decades are now being widely discussed by researchers and policy makers
alike. Probably as a result of this debate, the nineties saw a wave of legal initiatives
related to corporate governance (some driven by EU directives). These included,
among others, the Securities Trading Act of 1994, the Restructuring Act of 1995,
the Third Act on the Promotion of Financial Markets of 1998, the Takeover Code of
1995 and the Takeover Act of 2002, and the Code of Best Practice of 2002.
However, the regulatory trend still continues. There is a list of forthcoming
regulations that include, among others, the Draft Act on Improved Investor
Protection (Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz); the Draft Act Regulating Exem-
plary Investor Suits (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz); the Draft Act on
Liability for Capital Market Information (Kapitalmarktinformationsgesetz); the
Draft Act on Controlling Accounts (Bilanzkontrollgesetz); and the Draft Act on
Supervision of Auditors (Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Berufsaufsicht u¨ber
Abschlußpru¨fer in der Wirtschaftspru¨ferordnung, Abschlußpru¨feraufsichtsgesetz).
However, is this somehow anecdotic evidence strong enough to conclude that the
German system of corporate governance has changed and is definitely converging
towards the Anglo-American Model? Studies published in a recent special issue of
the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics tend to agree that, although a
certain convergence may have occurred, most of the distinctive features of the
German system are still in place. Hackethal et al. (2003, p. 671), for example,
maintains that these changes ‘‘do not seem to have a direct effect on the
fundamental structure of German corporate governance.’’ As for the legal reforms,
Terberger (2003, p. 715) points out that they ‘‘seem to have had shortcomings. Some
new rules and regulations have lacked enforcement, others left loopholes, and other
just did not set the right incentives’’ (see also Kirchmaier and Grant 2004). The
collection of papers in Krahnen and Schmidt (2004) provides further caveats on the
convergence process. They show that it is difficult to claim convergence in light of
the failure to develop a venture capital industry (the Neuer Markt collapsed after
five successful years of activity) and a market for corporate control (the
Mannesmann-Vodafone hostile takeover was a fairly isolated example and the vast
majority of the M&A activity is of a friendly nature).
There is therefore a certain controversy in the literature as to the convergence of
the German system towards the Anglo-American model, which is reflected in the
title of this paper. In the next sections we address this issue by analysing the recent
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evolution of the main economic (Sect. 3) and legal (Sect. 4) mechanisms of German
corporate governance. We will thus make inferences based on the examination of
the fundamental characteristics of the German system rather than on specific effects
observed in individual companies. This is a suitable approach for the kind of
institutional and comparative analysis developed here.
3 Governance mechanisms
In the finance literature, governance systems are usually classified according to the
trade-off between liquidity and control (Becht 1999), the differences in the legal
protection of investors (La Porta et al. 1998), and ‘‘the ways in which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’’
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 737). In this paper, we adopt a comprehensive view
and define a corporate governance system as the amalgam of institutional and
market-based mechanisms which ensure that the agent (i.e. the management) runs
the firm for the benefit of one or multiple principals (shareholders, creditors,
suppliers, clients, employees and other parties with whom the firm conducts its
business). The mechanisms available to ensure economic efficiency are manifold
and comprise (Becht and Boehmer 2003): (i) internal control mechanisms such as
the control structure (degree and locus of control) and the board of directors
(structure, turnover, and compensation), and (ii) external mechanisms such as
creditor (in particular bank) monitoring, the market for corporate control (both the
hostile takeover market and the market for partial corporate control), product market
competition, and the legal framework (statutory and voluntary regulations, but also
standards established by the stock exchanges). In this section, we first analyse these
internal mechanisms and then move onto the external mechanisms. We leave the
analysis of the legal changes to Sect. 4.
3.1 Internal governance mechanisms
3.1.1 Ownership structure and control
Table 1, adapted from Becht and Boehmer (2003), provides a summary of the recent
evidence on the ownership and control of German firms. This evidence shows that in
most German firms ownership and control are indeed concentrated. In particular,
Edwards and Nibler (2000) and Franks and Mayer (2001) report that more than half
of the listed German firms in their samples have an owner holding more than 50% of
the voting equity. Furthermore, Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999) show that the
actual proportion of voting rights exercised at the annual general meetings by the
largest shareholder in listed German firms gives him/her a comfortable majority
(55%). Control is also highly concentrated when it is measured as ultimate control
(Gorton and Schmid 2000a, b) and by the Cubbin and Leech (1983) index (Ko¨ke
2001). As expected, ultimate control is even more highly concentrated in unlisted
firms (Edwards and Nibler 2000; Ko¨ke 2004).
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Becht and Boehmer (2001, 2003) show that not only is there a high concentration
of voting power in listed companies (82% of them have a large blockholder
controlling ultimately more than 25% of the voting rights), but the largest
shareholder also often does not face other large shareholders. Only 20% of these
companies have more than two registered blockholders and the average size of the
second largest block (7.4%) is small. As many important decisions, such as
modifications to the firm’s charter, mergers, and changes in the firm’s capital
usually require a super-majority of 75% of the votes, a shareholder with more than
25% of the votes has a blocking minority. Becht and Boehmer (2003, p. 10) look at
the frequency of voting blocks in terms of their size and notice that ‘‘voting blocks
are clustered at 25, 50, and 75%. [This] suggest[s] that block sizes are carefully
chosen and control is an important issue for blockholders’’.
However, the German legal framework allows for dispersed ownership with
concentrated voting power through a number of mechanisms. The mechanisms we
consider are: (i) ownership pyramids, (ii) proxy votes, (iii) voting pacts, and (iv)
dual class shares.
The most widely used mechanism to obtain control with a limited investment is
ownership pyramids or cascades. This mechanism enables shareholders to maintain
control throughout multiple tiers of ownership while sharing the cash flow rights
with other (minority) shareholders at each intermediate ownership tier. Franks and
Mayer (2001) and Ko¨ke (2001) show that German corporations are often controlled
via such pyramids (see also Gorton and Schmid 2000a; Faccio and Lang 2002). On
one hand, this reduces the liquidity constraints that large shareholders face while
allowing them to retain substantial voting power. On the other hand, there is a risk
that these pyramids lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders (Becht 1999).
Johnson et al. (2000) and Buysschaert et al. (2004) provide examples of such
expropriations in France, Italy and Belgium. For the case of Germany, Ko¨ke (2001)
argues that at least in 10% of his sample the ultimate shareholder could prevent
efficient monitoring, as the cash flow rights of the largest shareholders amount to
only 25% or less of their control rights. Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999) show
that an increase in the largest shareholder’s control rights effectively harms minority
shareholders. However, they claim that these negative effects may be somewhat
compensated by the benefits obtained from the better monitoring of the management
when the largest shareholder is a non-bank firm or a public-sector body.
The second mechanism that gives control with limited cash flow rights is proxy
votes. In Germany, banks are the main exercisers of proxy votes given that most
shares are in the form of unregistered bearer shares and their holders normally
deposit them with their banks. The banks are allowed to cast the votes from these
shares (conditional upon the banks announcing how they will vote on specific
resolutions at the general meeting and upon the lack of receiving alternative
instructions by the depositors). For example, in the failed, hostile bid for Feldmu¨hle
Nobel by the Flick brothers, voting restrictions were imposed thanks to a resolution
supported by Deutsche Bank that eventually passed with 55% of the shares voted.
However, Deutsche Bank only held a direct share stake of about 8%; the rest were
proxy votes (Franks and Mayer 1998). Edwards and Nibler (2000) provide further
evidence on banks’ proxy votes for a sample of 156 listed and unlisted German
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companies in 1992. Their data shows that banks typically control more voting rights
via proxy votes than via their own stakes. Gorton and Schmid (2000a) present
analogous results based on 1975 and 1986 data. All in all, proxy votes seem to
provide effective voting power to German banks, especially to the three largest ones
(Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank) and mainly in large listed
companies.
The third mechanism to separate ownership and control is voting pacts. Voting
pacts enable shareholders to exert a much higher degree of control as a group than
the members of the pact would individually. As pointed out by Franks and Mayer
(2001), in many German corporations a (hypothetical) coalition formed by the two
or three largest shareholders could easily gain control. However, apart from the
notable exception of Crespi and Renneboog (2002), there is little empirical evidence
that long-term shareholder coalitions are formed in Europe because such coalitions
may bring about substantial costs. According to Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, p.
431), in corporate governance regimes such as the German one where multiple large
shareholders exist, ‘‘[control] [b]attles often involve a protracted, and clandestine,
shuffling of stakes between rival coalitions and the revising of pooling agreements.
Even large blockholders can find themselves, apparently without warning, as
members of the suppressed minorities.’’ Most coalitions are usually formed on an ad
hoc basis with a specific aim, such as the removal of badly performing management.
The fourth mechanism is dual class shares. Under a dual class regime, one class
(B-shares) has fewer voting rights than the other one (A-shares). Faccio and Lang
(2002) estimate that the proportion of firms with dual class shares outstanding in
Germany is 18%. Non-voting shares are also used by German firms, although they
must not exceed 50% of the stock capital. In any case, Goergen and Renneboog
(2003) demonstrate that the issuance of non-voting shares is very effective to
forestall any change in control. However, the issuing of multiple voting shares was
outlawed in Germany as of May 1998 and the grandfather clause was phased out on
1 June 2003. In addition, German firms can issue preference shares (Vorzugsaktien).
This is risk-bearing capital without votes, but with special dividend rights.
3.1.2 The nature of control
Not only does the degree of control matter for corporate governance, but so does the
type of the controlling shareholder. In Germany, empirical evidence on the
differences in terms of incentives, abilities and costs across different shareholders
can be found in Edwards and Nibler (2000), Gorton and Schmid (2000b), Lehmann
and Weigand (2000), Franks and Mayer (2001), Januszewski et al. (2002) and Ko¨ke
and Renneboog (2005). Table 2 compares the average sizes of the stakes held by the
different types of shareholders in German firms to those in other European
countries. Germany is similar to most other Continental European countries in the
sense that the most important type of shareholder is holding and industrial
companies. In detail, in Germany, the main shareholders are, in order of importance,
(i) holding and industrial companies, (ii) individuals and families, (iii) banks
(although, as pointed out in the previous section, proxy votes can make them even
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more powerful in the general meetings) and other institutional shareholders, and (iv)
public authorities.
a. Industrial and holding companies. The holding of share blocks by other
industrial companies is a well documented feature of the German corporate
governance regime (Prigge 1998). Faccio and Lang (2002) show that Germany is
the European country with the largest percentage of companies controlled by other
firms. This phenomenon is also prominent in the German financial sector. Table 2
shows that German holding companies and industrial companies control an average
stake of 21% in other listed German firms, which is largely corroborated by
Emmons and Schmid (1998) and Gorton and Schmid (2000b). In fact, according to
Becht and Boehmer (2003) about 80% of direct equity stakes in firms listed on the
official market belong to other firms (industrial firms, holding companies,
investment firms and financial firms). These large industrial shareholders may
obtain substantial private benefits at the expense of other shareholders or
stakeholders (Grossman and Hart 1988) and cross-holdings may have an important
negative impact on competition (Canoy et al. 2001). Moreover, there is evidence
that German firms controlled by other companies tend to have higher levels of
productivity (Januszewski et al. 2002) and are less likely to be acquired if they are
public corporations (Ko¨ke 2002).
b. Families or individuals. Table 2 also shows that individuals or families are one
of the main shareholder categories in Continental Europe (see also La Porta et al.
1999). In particular, Franks and Mayer (2001) have found that large-scale family
control is especially pronounced in the largest German firms. This finding was also
documented by Edwards and Nibler (2000) and Becht and Boehmer (2001). In 40
and 37% of their samples individuals or families hold blocks of on average 57 and












Austria 600 38.6 5.6 0.0 0.0 33.9 11.7 0.0
Belgium 155 15.6 0.4 1.0 3.8 37.5 0.3 0.0
France 402 15.5 16.0 3.5 0.0 34.5 1.0 0.0
Germany 402 7.4 1.2 0.2 0.0 21.0 0.7 0.0
Italy (1) 68.6 7.2 0.0 0.0 24.2 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 137 10.8 7.2 2.4 16.1 10.9 1.3 0.0
Spain 394 21.8 6.6 8.8 0.0 32.6 0.0 0.0
UK 248 2.4 1.1 4.7 11.0 5.9 0.0 11.3
Source: Renneboog (2000) and Barca and Becht (2001). The table gives the average cumulative per-
centage of share blocks (above 5%) held by different types of shareholders in listed companies, except for
Italy (1). Numbers for Italy refer to both listed (214) and large non-listed (about 8,000) companies. Also,
of the listed Italian companies about 25% are directly and indirectly controlled by state holdings and these
are classified in the table under ‘Holding and industrial companies’. Both direct and indirect share-
holdings are considered, except for the Netherlands and the UK (only direct shareholdings). Figures
reported are for the year 1996, except for Belgium (1994) and the UK (1993)
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20%, respectively, of the voting rights. In general, however, these blocks are much
more commonly found in small and medium-sized non-financial companies (Ko¨ke
2001; Faccio and Lang 2002).
c. Directors. A particular category of individuals controlling share stakes is that
of the directors, who are insiders and therefore possess superior information on the
firms’ prospects. However, Table 2 suggests that Continental European managers
are not shareholders of the firms they manage. Actually, hardly any information is
known about directors’ control in Continental Europe for the following reasons: (i)
the shareholdings of most directors are below the disclosure thresholds, (ii) although
large family blockholders frequently appoint their representatives (which can be
family members) to the board, the origin of board representatives does not need to
be disclosed publicly, and (iii) the use of intermediate investment companies further
obscures directors’ control. Whatever the reasons, we have found only two German
studies presenting data referring to this category. First, Gorton and Schmid (2000b)
show that the management owns at least 50% of the votes in 8% of the firms in their
1992 sample. Moreover, 15% of the firms have their largest shareholder as a
member of the management board. Second, Ko¨ke (2004) reports the ultimate control
for a sample of listed and unlisted firms for the years 1987–1994. The average stake
of the (executive and non-executive) directors and their families is 22.5% for quoted
firms and 12% for unquoted firms. These figures suggest that in a non-negligible
number of German companies there is no separation between ownership and control
because ‘‘managers own’’ and ‘‘owners manage’’.
d. Banks and other institutional shareholders. There is an extensive theoretical
literature on the role and incentives of bank monitoring (see e.g. Rajan and
Diamond 2000). In contrast, bank shareholdings in Germany—as well as other
Continental European countries—are generally small and decreasing (Wo¨jcik
2003). Only 5.8% of the large voting stakes of 5% or more are held (directly as well
as indirectly) by banks, resulting in an average of 1.2% of the overall votes. One
reason for this may be the avoidance of potential conflicts of interest (Canoy et al.
2001; Goergen and Renneboog 2001). However, from what we have said above, it is
clear that the influence of banks is understated if one merely looks at their direct and
indirect stakes and ignores their proxy votes.
As for the other types of institutional shareholders, Ko¨ke (2001) shows that they
have a strong preference for listed firms. However, only insurance companies seem
to be important. In sharp contrast with the UK and the US, other institutional
investors (notably investment funds) do not hold significant stakes in German
companies (O’Sullivan 2000; Davis and Steil 2001). Empirical evidence from the
firms listed on the German official market (Amtlicher Handel) shows that whereas
20 insurance companies hold shares representing around 17% of the market
capitalization, the rest of the institutional investors (excluding banks) barely reach
0.5% (Wo¨jcik 2002). Given the close links between insurance firms and banks in
Germany, the importance of the former further reinforces the role of banks as major
shareholders (Goldman Sachs 2000; Canoy et al. 2001).
e. Public authorities. Despite the large-scale privatisation programmes that
occurred in Europe over the last decades, in many listed European firms the state is
still one of the largest shareholders (La Porta et al. 1999). To this respect, one has to
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take into account the privatization of East German firms during the early 1990s
(Dyck 1997; Hau 1998). Even when controlling for this specific privatization
process, the importance of public authorities as shareholders remains considerable,
especially in large firms (Ko¨ke 2001; Faccio and Lang 2002). However, their
importance has continuously declined. As an illustration, in 1997 the value of their
holdings in the firms listed on the official market or Amtlicher Handel was about
21% of the total market capitalization. Already in 2001, public holdings represented
only 14% of the market capitalization (Wo¨jcik 2002). In terms of the number of
firms in which the government was the largest shareholder, figures range from 6%
(Franks and Mayer 2001; Emmons and Schmid 1998) to 8% (Edwards and Nibler
2000; Gorton and Schmid 2000b).
3.1.3 Summary of control structure
There is considerable evidence showing that control is very concentrated in German
firms. Although some of the devices used to separate ownership and control are not
legal anymore (e.g. voting caps and multiple voting shares), it is not uncommon to
find dispersed ownership combined with strong voting power. German corporate
control is very much dominated by wealthy individuals and families. The lack of
institutional blockholders (apart from banks, which seem to be losing in importance)
suggests that, in contrast to the Anglo-American countries, little shareholder
activism is to be expected from these institutions. All these features indicate that the
control structure of the German corporation (still) corresponds to that of an insider,
bank-centred system of corporate governance.
3.2 Boards
3.2.1 Structure
To the opposite of most Western economies, Germany has a two-tier board with a
management board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).3 The German
supervisory board represents the shareholders and employees, but it is usually
dominated by representatives of the large shareholders. In large firms with more
than 2,000 employees, the 1976 Codetermination Act created a system of quasi-
parity co-determination. Employee representatives make up half of the supervisory
board but the chairman who is a shareholder representative has a casting vote in
case of a stale-mate. Bankers are frequently elected to the supervisory board, even
as chairmen (Edwards and Nibler 2000). In small companies with more than 500 but
less than 2,000 employees, one third of the supervisory board consists of employee
representatives. Finally, full-parity co-determination by shareholders and employees
is limited to the steel and coal sectors (which are subject to the 1951 Coal and Steel
3 However, differences between the one-tier and the two-tier systems are relative, as supervisory and
management boards do not meet separately in Germany.
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(Montan) Codetermination Act). The only companies that are exempt from having a
supervisory board with co-determination are those that can appeal to the
constitutional freedoms of faith and free press (e.g. the publishing company
Springer). The directors of German firms are usually appointed for a term covering
the legal maximum of 5 years, although reappointment at the end of the term is
possible.
In a recent paper, Renaud (2007) presents evidence that the introduction of parity
co-determination does not reduce the productivity or profitability in the affected
companies. Still, the author admits there is a benchmarking problem as data on
companies without co-determination, mostly very small companies, is very difficult
to collect. Also, Hertig (2006) argues that transparency may be better served by
using co-determination as an information channel, rather than by importing the
mandatory disclosure requirements that are typical of Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions.
There are two reasons for this. First, the evidence about the efficiency of mandatory
disclosure requirements is mixed. Second, mandatory disclosure is an intrinsic
component of market-oriented financial systems such as the US financial system.
The author argues that transplanting a market-oriented component into a bank-
oriented financial system brings the risk of inconsistencies, as this affects the
complementarities that exist among the intrinsic components of a bank-oriented
system.
While the above two papers praise the system of co-determination, they also form
a small minority. In contrast, Roe (1999: 194), a representative of the other camp,
argues that ‘‘German codetermination (…) undermines diffuse ownership for two,
related reasons. One, stockholders may wish that the firm’s governing institutions to
have a blockholding ‘balance of power’, a balance that, given German’s law
mandate that half the supervisory board represent employees, diffusely owned firms
may be unable to create. (…) Two, managers and stockholders sapped the
supervisory board of power (…) to reduce influence in the firm. Board meetings are
infrequent, information flow to the board is poor, and the board is often too big and
unwieldy to be effective. Instead of boardroom governance, out-of-the-boardroom
caucuses and meetings between managers and large shareholders substitute for
effective boardroom action’’.
3.2.2 Turnover
The disciplining of the top management (and in particular of the CEO) as a
governance mechanism has received considerable empirical attention (Murphy
1999). For Germany, Kaplan (1994a) presents evidence that management board
turnover is closely related to poor stock performance and earnings losses, but not to
sales and earnings growth. In contrast, the turnover of the chairman of the
supervisory board is more likely to occur when the firm’s net income falls. In
addition, poor stock performance also causes supervisory board dismissals. Three
additional results are worth mentioning. First, the evidence is consistent with the
view that the German corporate governance regime is based on a long-term
perspective of the firm (Porter 1992). Second, the sensitivity of executive turnover
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to corporate performance in Germany is comparable to that in Japan and the US
(Kaplan 1994b; Kaplan and Minton 1994). Third, neither large shareholders nor
bank control seem to protect managers from the possibility of being dismissed when
their company performs poorly.
These results call into question the view that in bank-based regimes, such as the
German one, managers may be entrenched at the expense of minority shareholders
(Coffee 1991; Roe 1993). However, the results are not entirely supported by Franks
and Mayer (2001). Indeed, their study suggests that supervisory board turnover
depends on corporate performance only when there is a change in control. In
general, supervisory board turnover of firms which are incurring losses is not
statistically different from that of firms generating profits. However, it is
significantly higher for poorly performing firms with new blockholders. Manage-
ment board turnover is higher for loss makers than for non-loss makers, but,
contrary to the case of supervisory board turnover, it is only statistically significant
in the sub-sample of firms with stable holdings.
3.2.3 Compensation
Perhaps the simplest economic device for aligning managers’ interests with those of
the shareholders (or more generally, stakeholders) is a compensation contract that
specifies the tasks and rewards of the executive directors for each outcome of
corporate performance (Ferrarini et al. 2004). Table 3 compares CEO remuneration
in Germany to the rest of Europe and the US. German CEOs are among the lowest
paid in Europe. In terms of the share of the basic compensation in the total pay
package (47%), German CEOs are no different from their European counterparts,
but are substantially different when compared to US CEOs (28%). In particular,
German CEOs appear to have the highest total cash pay in Europe but have the
lowest non-cash remuneration. This may explain why the total remuneration
package of German executives is low compared to other European executives
Table 3 CEO Remuneration in Germany (as compared to the rest of Europe and the USA)
Total Remuneration ($) Pay Components (As a percentage of total remuneration)
Basic Compensation Variable Pay Benefits Perquisites
Belgium 696,697 46 24 28 2
France 519,060 46 26 21 7
Germany 454,979 47 36 12 5
Italy 600,319 43 33 20 4
Netherlands 600,854 47 36 13 4
Spain 429,725 51 36 10 3
Sweden 413,860 46 25 27 2
UK 668,526 43 30 21 6
USA 1,932,580 28 61 6 5
Source: Towers Perrin, Worldwide total remuneration (2001–2002)
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(Conyon and Schwalbach 1999, 2000a). In the mean time, large German firms are
increasingly adopting variable payments (Tuschke and Sanders 2003). In addition,
Schmidt and Schwalbach (2007) report that in the largest German firms, i.e. those
forming the DAX stock market index, the variable part now makes out at least 40%
of the total remuneration.
The factors influencing the remuneration of German managers have recently been a
matter of further systematic research (Kraft and Niederpru¨m 1999). Elston and
Goldberg (2003) investigate the monetary compensation of the members of the
management and supervisory boards of German firms and confirm the results of
Schmid (1997). First, although the size effect (positively) dominates the compensation
equation, there exists a positive sensitivity of managerial pay to company performance
in Germany. Conyon and Schwalbach (2000b) confirm this relation. Second, the
Elston and Goldberg (2003) study shows that managers and directors of widely held
firms receive a substantially higher monetary compensation than those of firms with
large blockholders. Third, firms with monitoring house banks (which own an equity
stake, are major providers of loan capital and frequently have board representation)
generally pay managers and directors comparatively less than widely held firms.
Tuschke and Sanders (2003) investigate the adoption of stock-based compensation.
They show that the relationship between the likelihood of adopting stock-based
incentives and control concentration in listed German firms has an inverted-U shape
with the maximum being in the first quartile of control concentration. In addition,
Schwalbach (2004) reports that, while in the past it was not linked to corporate
performance, recently the remuneration of supervisory board members has become
increasingly tied in with performance and has also increased in level.
3.2.4 Summary of boards
The idiosyncratic structure for German boards is often seen as a major cause of
entrenchment. However, the extant evidence suggests that German directors and
CEOs are clearly exposed to being fired if the firm does not perform well. The
evidence is as yet limited which makes it impossible to conclude whether large
shareholders and banks mitigate this disciplinary action. As for the compensation
policies, they seem to have succeeded in aligning managers’ and shareholders’
interests by creating a pay-performance sensitivity. However, both the variable pay
and the pay package of German CEOs look meagre when compared to their US
counterparts. In the light of this evidence, it is tempting to conclude that a certain
degree of convergence towards a market-model has occurred. Having said this, the
differences between a typical German AG and a typical American corporation are
still substantial.
3.3 External corporate governance mechanisms
We now turn to the discussion of the external corporate governance mechanisms. In
particular, we discuss the evidence on creditor monitoring, the market for corporate
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control, the market for partial control and product market competition. In Sect. 4,
we then address the recent evolution of corporate governance regulation.
3.3.1 Creditor monitoring
Large creditors in bank-based economies such as Germany typically hold a variety
of control rights and have therefore sufficient power to monitor. Consequently, bank
monitoring may act as a substitute for alternative corporate governance devices.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large creditors fulfil a role similar to that of
large shareholders because they have large investments in the firm and have
therefore a strong incentive to monitor the firm’s management. Given the
monitoring performed by the bank, there is less need for (other) external
disciplining. Ko¨ke and Renneboog (2005) provide empirical evidence that German
firms, which are exposed to tight creditor control and operate in competitive
markets, experience higher productivity growth.
Another important characteristic of bank-centred regimes such as the German
one relates to the lending relationships (Deeg 1998; Vitols 1998). Banks owning
shares in listed firms are frequently also the main bank or Hausbank to these firms
(Edwards and Fischer 1994). The long-term lending relationships give banks
considerable power, which is frequently strengthened by bank representation on the
supervisory board of the firm. Schmidt (2003) states that membership of a
supervisory board provides an important source of privileged and valuable
information. In contrast, Edwards and Nibler (2000, p. 260) conclude that ‘‘German
banks do not play a role in the governance of large listed firms which is distinct
from their position as one of several types of large shareholder’’.
In any case, what is clear is that each type of the Hausbank’s claims (debt and
equity) may give rise to a different optimal decision in the wake of financial distress.
When there is a danger of bankruptcy and the bank faces a refinancing demand by
the firm, its creditor claims may encourage the bank to make the firm file for
liquidation whereas the equity claims may lead the bank to revolve its loans. Such
conflicts of interest may even be exacerbated by the fact that in Germany (as in
Belgium, France and Italy) intricate control-based networks exist such that the
bank’s decision may be influenced by the objectives of the network/conglomerate.
Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and Edwards and Fischer (1994) document that
banks intervene in case their corporate client runs into financial distress. However,
Agarwal and Elston (2001) are not convinced about whether firms benefit from
better access to capital, as their interest payments to debt ratio is also significantly
higher. This suggests that German banks engage in rent-seeking activities.
Finally, Jenkinson and Ljungvist (2001, pp. 430–431) ‘‘identify another
important role of banks, namely their role in assisting companies pursuing a
strategy of hostile stakebuilding. […] [B]anks play a pivotal role in building,
brokering and concealing stakes. In contrast, it is striking how few examples [they]
find of banks actively defending target companies from a hostile stakebuilder. Such
behaviour may, of course, be compatible with the view that banks actively monitor
German companies […] However, it is important to recognise that this role is
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performed not by the companies’ house banks […], but by the banks assisting the
predator’’.
While the above literature demonstrates that banks do indeed perform an
important role as monitors (see Degryse et al. 2007 for an overview), some
researchers are more sceptical. Banks may put a break on the investment activity of
firms, which over the long run reduces the firms’ competitiveness. Also, bank-
representatives on boards may reduce risk taking, thereby further limiting the
competitiveness of the company. Finally, the inside information held by bank
representatives leads to asymmetric information between insider and outsider credit
banks which reduces the intensity of credit competition due to the ‘‘winner’s curse’’
problem (von Thadden 2004).
3.3.2 The market for corporate control
Hostile takeovers are often considered to be one the most distinctive features of
market-oriented regimes. In contrast, a study of the European domestic and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions market shows that the market for corporate control
in Germany is very limited (Goergen and Renneboog 2003). The main reason for
this is that, as shown in previous sections, the vast majority of firms have a large
controlling shareholder. Pyramiding and cross-shareholdings further hinder takeover
attempts (Prigge 1998; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). Another reason is that the
legal and regulatory framework in Germany has been lagging behind that of other
countries in terms of disclosure, transparency and shareholder protection (see
McCahery and Renneboog 2003 and Sect. 4 of this paper). Finally, the following
takeover codes and legislation have created further barriers to takeover activity:
a. Taxation. Prior to 2002, the capital gains resulting from sales of equity stakes
by corporations and financial institutions were taxed at the corporate tax rate (see
Sect. 4). In practice this imposed a substantial cost on a redistribution of ownership
and control.
b. Court actions by dissenting shareholders. Prior to 2002, (minority)
shareholders disagreeing with decisions taken at the annual general meeting could
stall these decisions over long periods of time, even though they had been approved
by a qualified majority of 75% of the votes (Beinert 2000; Schmid and Wahrenburg
2003).
c. Board entrenchment. The management board is legally entrenched: only the
supervisory board can remove the management board members who are usually
appointed for a term corresponding to the legal maximum of 5 years. In other
words, a new controlling shareholder cannot remove the management board until
their contracts have expired. Furthermore, the supervisory board is also legally
entrenched: the representatives of the shareholders and employees have contracts
for up to 5 years (subject to reappointment). Consequently, a new controlling
shareholder may not be able to obtain immediate control of the supervisory board.
d. Proxy voting. Shareholders depositing their shares with their bank frequently
grant permission to the bank to exercise their votes. Although, in principle, banks
have to ask permission and state how they intend to vote on specific proposals, this
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was not common practice prior to the Control and Transparency Act (KonTraG) of
1998. The importance of proxy voting is confirmed by Schmid and Wahrenburg
(2003) who claim that in quoted German corporations with dispersed control the
large German universal banks jointly control the majority of the votes at the annual
meetings.
e. Registered shares. Whereas most shares in German firms are bearer shares,
some firms (mainly in the insurance and media industries) have issued registered
shares (vinkulierte Namensaktien). Such shares are a very effective anti-takeover
device, as they can only be transferred with the approval of the directors.
f. Voting restrictions, multiple votes and non-voting shares. Voting restrictions
restrict the percentage of voting rights any shareholder can exercise. However, the
Third Act on the Promotion of Financial Markets (Drittes Finan-
zmarktfo¨rderungsgesetz) of 1998 put a stop to the introduction of such voting
restrictions. The grandfather clause for existing restrictions ended on 1 June 2000.
The law also bans the issue of multiple voting rights, although a grandfather clause
was created for such shares outstanding. The grandfather clause ended on 1 June
2003. However, German firms are still allowed to issue non-voting shares, although
only for a maximum of 50% of the total equity issued.
The following figures highlight the almost complete absence of disciplining by
the market of corporate control in Germany. Whereas during the period of 1984–
1989 there were an annual average of 40 hostile bids per annum in the UK
(Jenkinson and Mayer 1994), only three hostile takeovers (Feldmu¨hle Nobel in
1988–89, Hoesch in 1990–91 and Continental in 1991–92) have occurred in
Germany since WWII (Franks and Mayer 1998). Hence, one can conclude that there
is no active market for corporate control in Germany (Franks and Mayer 1996; Ko¨ke
2004). The hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone is simply a rara avis.
3.3.3 The market for partial corporate control
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) provide some empirical evidence on the existence
of a market for large share stakes in Germany. They find that 64 German companies
out of all the listed firms in 1991 were potentially vulnerable to a hostile attack
(given their control structure and lack of takeover defences). Moreover, they
identify 17 cases of hostile stakebuilding among the 2,511 changes in control that
occurred over the period of 1988–1996 and involved German firms as targets.
Franks and Mayer (2001) also find evidence of turnover of share stakes over the
period of 1988–1991, with new shareholders emerging in 22% of the companies and
old shareholders disappearing in 13% of the companies. Still, Franks and Mayer
stress the differences between the Anglo-American markets for corporate control
and the German market for partial control. First, the German market permits price
discrimination between sellers of share blocks and other investors and, second, the
overall gains from mergers as reflected in the bid premiums are low in relation to
those in the UK and the US. Finally, for the period of 1980–1995, Boehmer (2000)
reports 715 purchases by 127 acquiring firms of at least 50% of the votes in the
corporations listed on the Frankfurt official market. Part of these purchases can be
56 M. Goergen et al.
123
considered as hostile and motivated by a disciplining effect. According to Ko¨ke
(2004), the motive behind a large part of the German block trades is the acquisition
of control over the target firm.
However, it is less clear whether this market for share blocks is indeed a
substitute for the market for corporate control. Ko¨ke (2002) shows that, typically,
poorly performing firms are more likely to be acquired. However, Franks and Mayer
(2001) find no evidence of higher management board turnover in targets that were
performing poorly and thus argue that these block purchases are not disciplinary in
nature. Conversely, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) find some evidence of post-
acquisition management turnover in 7 of the 17 cases of stake building analysed and
a slight improvement in the performance of the target companies. Still, they stress
that the bidder seems to be motivated by strategic investments (overcapacity, market
power, etc.) rather than disciplining ‘‘wayward managers’’. Similarly, Ko¨ke (2004)
reports management turnover, assets divestitures (only in listed firms) and layoffs
(ibidem) following control changes, but no significant changes in performance.
Goergen and Renneboog (2003) find that the control structure of the bidder has an
impact on the link between control changes and past performance. They show that
the probability of being (partially) taken over by a bidder who has concentrated
control increases if past performance was good, whereas the probability of being
taken over by a widely held bidder decreases. Finally, Boehmer (2000) concludes
that, especially when the bidder is a non-financial minority blockholder, changes in
control tend to increase the value of the acquiring firm.
3.3.4 Product market competition
Ever since Adam Smith’s celebrated book, economists have argued that product
market competition provides incentives for the efficient organization of production.
A number of theoretical models have make this point (see e.g. Allen and Gale 2000
for a review) and there is also supportive empirical evidence (see e.g. Nickell 1996).
In particular, intense competition in the product market may reduce managerial
slack through at least four different channels: income, risk, information and value of
managerial actions. Under certain conditions the basic insight that competition
improves management performance holds, i.e. the positive income effect dominates.
Ultimately, however, the combined result of these four effects is ambiguous,
‘‘indicating that there is no definitive theoretical relationship between the level of
competition and executive behavior’’ (Hermalin 1992, p. 361).
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the interaction between product market
competition and corporate governance is scarce (Klette 1999). The evidence
suggests that both product market competition and the level of corporate governance
boost firm performance. In a pioneering study, Nickell et al. (1997) analyse the
productivity growth of UK manufacturing firms and find that the degree of market
competition and shareholder control are associated with high productivity growth.
They conclude that competition (and debt) may be a substitutive for internal control.
Following the same econometric methodology, two recent studies provide evidence
on German firms. First, Januszewski et al. (2002) present evidence of a positive
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(negative) effect of product market competition on productivity growth (the
productivity level). Their results also show that control concentration has a positive
effect on productivity growth and that this effect is even larger in firms facing
intense product market competition, i.e. competition and tight control are
complements (Soskice 1997). In contrast, financial control has a negative impact
on productivity growth. Second, Ko¨ke and Renneboog (2005) analyse two samples
of firms: one from a market-oriented system of corporate governance (the UK) and
the other one from a bank-based system (Germany). A lack of product market
competition in Germany has a detrimental effect on productivity growth.
Blockholder control (at the ultimate level) somewhat attenuates the negative effect
of weak competition on productivity changes (while the negative effect of weak
competition prevails). This blockholder effect is largely limited to banks, large
insurance firms and government stakes.
The results of Ko¨ke and Renneboog (2005) are therefore consistent with Cable
(1985), who documents a disciplinary role of German banks for the 1970’s, and with
Elsas and Krahnen (1998), who confirm (based on credit-file data) that German
housebanks provide liquidity insurance in times of financial difficulties. The results
are also consistent with Gorton and Schmid (2000a), Lehmann and Weigand (2000)
and Ko¨ke (2004) who find a positive impact of bank control on earnings-based
performance measures. Overall, Degryse et al. (2007), who reviews the literature,
argues that the effect of bank monitoring on corporate performance is positive. All
of these findings are at odds with the sceptical view of the German corporate
governance model which states that Germany is too dependent on banks and
therefore too inflexible compared to the Anglo-Saxon market-oriented system
(Hellwig 2000; Edwards and Nibler 2000).
3.3.5 Summary of external mechanisms
We find no clear signs of convergence when analysing the external governance
mechanisms. Hostile takeovers in Germany face a number of hurdles (including
legal hurdles and concentrated control) which makes them a rare occurrence and an
unlikely disciplinary mechanism. As for the disciplinary character of the market for
partial corporate control, the evidence in this respect is not fully conclusive, but it
tends to be unsupportive. Only product market competition seems to be acting as an
effective external corporate governance mechanism. All in all, the external
mechanisms appear to be fairly unimportant, except for bank monitoring which
plays a critical and complex role in German corporate governance.
4 Laws, codes and the stock exchange
All of the above corporate governance mechanisms should be studied within a
country’s specific regulatory context. Since strong shareholder protection reduces
the danger of expropriation of minority shareholders, the development of legal rules
(such as the mandatory bid rule in the case of takeovers) and codes of best practice
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should be priced by the markets. Consistent with this tenet, recent empirical work by
Beck et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (2000) finds that firms operating in
jurisdictions with strong shareholder protection have a higher growth potential, as
measured by Tobin’s Q. In Germany, Drobetz et al. (2003) relate the protection of
shareholder rights to the long-run performance of a cross-section of firms. They
construct an index based on five categories of corporate governance rules and
provide evidence that better shareholder protection leads to higher firm valuations
(measured by the price earnings ratio and the market to book ratio). What these
studies tend to confirm is the comparative advantage of countries that protect
investors’ interests. They also document a positive effect of better corporate
governance protection on financial market development (see, however, Bebchuk
and Roe 1999; Berglo¨f and von Thadden 2000; Hellwig 2000).
It is therefore important to discuss changes in the German legal framework that
may have affected corporate governance. We first address statutory and voluntary
regulation. We then review the recent stock exchange developments.
4.1 Statutory regulation
Since the mid 1990s, important new laws have been passed in order to promote the
financial markets (Finanzmarktfo¨rderungsgesetze), increase transparency and
accountability, and create a level playing field on the market for corporate control.
In this section, we review the Securities Trading Act of 1994 (Wertpapierhandelsge-
setz), the revised Restructuring Act of 1995 (Umwandlungsgesetz), the Act Against
Restraints on Competition of 1998 (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkungen), the
Third Act on the Promotion of Financial Markets of 1998 (Drittes Finan-
zmarktfo¨rderungsgesetz), the Act on the Control and Transparency of Corporations
of 1998 (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich), the
Takeover Act of 2002 (Unternehmensu¨bernahmegesetz), and the capital gains tax of
2002. Next we examine the main elements of these regulations that may affect
corporate governance.
4.1.1 The Securities Trading Act (1994)
This law is part of the Second Act on the Promotion of Financial Markets and
essentially incorporates EU regulation into German law.4 This act applies to all
companies with headquarters in Germany and traded on an EU stock exchange (and
not just a German one) and deals with the disclosure of information about the
company’s shareholder structure and with insider trading regulation.5 Prior to 1995,
little was known about the shareholder structure of German firms as the Stock
4 In particular, the following EU directives were (partially) implemented into German law: the Insider
Directive (89/592/EEC), the Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC) and the Investment Services Directive
(93/22/EEC).
5 The law, however, does not regulate the exchanges, which is a matter of the Stock Exchange Act.
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Corporation Act stipulated that shareholders only had to report their stakes if these
exceeded the thresholds of 25 and 50%, respectively. The Securities Trading Act,
which became effective on 1 January 1995, states that stakes above the thresholds
of 5, 10, 25, 50 and 75% of the voting rights (be it from above or below) need
to be disclosed to the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA, Bundesanstalt fu¨r
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht). The FSA then makes this information public.
However, the stock exchanges may impose stricter disclosure requirements than
those of the Securities Trading Act. In addition, the act labels insider trading as a
criminal offence (Baums 2002; Schmid and Wahrenburg 2003).
4.1.2 The revised Restructuring Act (1995)
The Act allows for tax-efficient restructuring and ensures that restructuring is not
delayed as a result of lawsuits by minority shareholders. Beinert (2000) states that
corporate restructuring (mergers, break-ups, spin-offs, transfers of assets and
changes in legal status) can be done at book value (without revaluation).
Consequently, capital gains taxation on asset revaluations (write-ups) can be
avoided. A corporate restructuring requires the approval of a qualified majority of at
least 75% of the voting capital represented at the annual general meeting. However,
the Stock Corporation Act generally allows (minority) shareholders to challenge
such a restructuring in court even though it has been approved by a supermajority.
Such court actions may delay the restructuring for many years. The Restructuring
Act supersedes the Stock Corporation Act; shareholders who feel disadvantaged can
still sue the firm for damages but cannot stall the restructuring anymore.
4.1.3 The Act Against Restraints on Competition (1957)
This antitrust law dates back to 1957 and came into force on 1 January 1958. The
act has been subject to successive amendments and the latest amendment dates
back to 1 July 2005. The act tests whether business combinations lead to the
extraction of monopoly rents on the market for goods and services. From a
governance perspective the interest of the act lies in the definition of a business
combination in the wide sense. The act does not just cover mergers and
acquisitions, but also acquisitions of share stakes of 25% and above. This definition
makes block trades above the 25% limit subject to the scrutiny of the competition
authority. The latest amendment gives the German Cartel Office the authority to
intervene when illegal business practices may restrict trade between member states
of the European Union.
4.1.4 The Third Act on the Promotion of Financial Markets (1998)
This Act bans the introduction of voting restrictions and grants a grandfather clause
for existing restrictions which was valid until 1 June 2000. The Act also bans the
60 M. Goergen et al.
123
issue of multiple voting rights, although a grandfather clause was created for
existing shares with multiple votes. However, since 1 June 2003 multiple voting
shares are no longer permissible. It should be noted that German firms are still
allowed to issue non-voting shares, but only for a maximum of 50% of the total
equity issued.
4.1.5 The Act on the Control and Transparency of Corporations (1998)
This Act amends one of the most important pieces of German corporate law: the
Public Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) of 1965. The act was designed to improve
transparency and to reform internal corporate governance mechanisms, with
particular focus on the supervisory board (Hopt and Leyens 2004). The act abolishes
multiple voting stocks or caps on voting rights; allows shareholders holding 5% of
the stock to demand the supervisory board to take action against managing directors
if there is strong suspicion of negligence or dishonesty; limits to ten the number of
supervisory board seats and to five the number of chairmanships a single person can
hold; and obliges banks to ask for permission before exercising their customers’
votes and to disclose the names of any members of their (supervisory and
management) boards serving on the boards of other companies. The act also
requires more frequent meetings of supervisory boards and greater disclosure of the
candidates credentials; and extends responsibilities on auditing and on the reviewing
of (consolidated as well as unconsolidated) financial statements. Finally, the act
alleviates restrictions on the use of stock options, which are now permitted subject
to shareholder approval (Baums 2000; Gordon 2004).
4.1.6 The Takeover Act (2002)
This Act is closely linked to the failure to implement a self-regulatory framework by
the Takeover Code of 1995 (see below) and to the German turnabout to the
proposed 13th Company Law Directive on Takeovers (Berglo¨f and Burkart 2003;
McCahery and Renneboog 2003). The Takeover Act, which became effective on 1
January 2002, requires that a mandatory tender offer needs to be made for the rest of
the equity as soon as an investor acquires 30% of a firm’s voting rights. Moreover,
the Takeover Act does not allow restricted tender offers (in case a shareholder has
acquired at least 30%) but allows conditional tender offers. A restricted offer is an
offer applying to e.g. 40% of the shares; a conditional offer is a bid for X percent of
the shares which will be purchased provided that the bidder gets at least Y percent
of the shares. Finally, paragraph 33 of the Takeover Act also renders golden
parachutes offered by the bidder to the target’s management/directors illegal. This
rule will prevent the payment of huge amounts of severance pay (as in the case of
the Mannesmann takeover by Vodafone).
This mandatory bid is likely to reduce block trades that were common prior to
2002 (Ko¨ke 2004; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). On the one hand, the law
invokes the principle that the target management should take a neutral stance in a
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takeover attempt. On the other hand, paragraph 33 of the Act obliges the
management to take any actions in the best interest of the corporation, such as anti-
takeover measures. The defensive measures that are allowed are: actions that dilute
the share stake of the bidding investor (a new equity issue to friendly parties while
excluding pre-emption rights, share repurchases), a pac-man defence (i.e. a counter-
bid for the bidder’s shares), the sale of the crown jewels, and soliciting bids from
white knights. However, all these measures, apart from the last one, are subject to
the approval of the supervisory board. Finally shareholders representing at least
75% of the votes can give the management full discretion to set up any anti-takeover
action.6
Another important change introduced by this law is the introduction of squeeze-
out rules. Whereas in the past minority shareholders could stall a merger or
acquisition by fighting a squeeze-out in the courts, the Takeover Act states that the
shares of the residual minority shareholders can be transferred to a shareholder
holding at least 95% of the equity. In this case, the minority shareholders who are
‘squeezed out’ will no longer be able to stall the takeover process, but can ask for a
cash compensation in the courts if their rights are violated.
4.1.7 Capital gains tax (2002)
From 1 January 2002, divestitures of equity stakes no longer incur capital gains tax.
Prior to that date, many corporations and financial institutions preferred to retain
their stakes in German companies rather than sell them because the resulting capital
gains would have been taxed at the full corporate tax rate.
4.2 Codes
Until very recently, voluntary regulation and codes of best practice were virtually
unheard of in Germany which has traditionally relied on statutory regulation to
shape its corporate governance system. The introduction of the Takeover and best
practice codes is therefore an important innovation. In what follows, we review the
main characteristics of these codes.
4.2.1 The Takeover Code (1995)
The Takeover Code of 1995 (U¨bernahmekodex der Bo¨rsensachversta¨ndigenkom-
mission beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen of 14 July 1995, amended on 1
January 1998) was introduced as a voluntary code of conduct for firms involved in a
merger or acquisition. The code, somehow based on the English City Code and early
drafts of the 13th Directive, called for mandatory takeover bids as soon as a party
had acquired control (50% of the votes or 75% of the votes present at the latest
6 This approval needs to be renewed after a period of 18 months.
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shareholders’ meeting). Still, the code had a limited impact because it was not
followed by several of the largest German firms and there were numerous violations
of the code by its signatories. The enactment of the Takeover Law of 2002 brought
an end to the self-regulatory takeover regime in Germany.
4.2.2 Codes of best practice (2001–2002)
Another attempt to introduce voluntary codes arises from the creation of the German
Panel on Corporate Governance in July 2001 (Bericht der Regierungskommission
Corporate Governance). The Panel, chaired by Professor Baums, urged the federal
government to begin drafting a ‘‘Transparency and Disclosure Act’’ which would
implement further proposals of the Panel. This would include the legal foundation
for the ‘‘comply or explain’’ principle, measures to strengthen the role of
supervisory boards (through broader disclosure, the definition of the duties for the
management board and tighter confidentiality requirements for supervisory board
members) and the use of electronic media for company publications.
Related to the functioning of the management and supervisory boards, the Panel
recommended the tightening of the fiduciary duties by extending the civil liability of
management and supervisory board members from its current standard of ‘‘wilful
intent’’ to include ‘‘gross negligence’’ in connection with the release of false
information to the capital market. Furthermore, the number of external supervisory
board positions that a supervisory board member may hold should be limited to five
in order to strengthen the independence of supervisory board members. A
supervisory board member should not hold office in or represent other companies
that are in competition with his or her company. The Panel also recommends
improving the transparency standards, such as those for management stock option
plans and those for the shareholdings of members of the management and
supervisory boards, as well as increasing the duties of the management board to
provide information to stockholders. In addition, the independence of auditors
should be strengthened.7 The Panel is also in favour of eliminating the requirement
that shares be deposited as a prerequisite for voting at the shareholders’ meeting.
The Cromme Code (26 February 2002) works under an comply-or-explain
regime and partially follows the proposals from the government panel relating to
corporate governance principles (see e.g. Hopt 2004 for a detailed account of the
Code’s recommendations.). Still, the main contribution of this code is a structured
summary of the regulatory changes in terms of disclosure and transparency, the
duties of the management and supervisory board (the core of the code),
remuneration contracts, the formation of committees, etc. The code recommends
that firms should allow remote access by shareholders to the general meetings using
modern communication media (such as the internet). In terms of accounting
7 While the independence of the auditor is a key concept shared by the German as well as the UK and US
systems, Hommelhoff and Mattheus (2003) argue that the role of the auditor under the German system is
not just limited to being a gatekeeper (‘‘Kontrollfunktion’’ or ‘‘Garantiefunktion’’) but also includes
assisting the supervisory board in its internal audit of the activities of the management board
(‘‘Unterstu¨tzungsfunktion’’).
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standards, the historical accounting conventions of the German Handelsgesetzbuch
(HGB) demand less disclosure than e.g. the US GAAP-rules of the Federal
Accounting Standards Board. However, over the past few years, many German
firms have voluntarily adopted the GAAP-rules of the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) under the Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz (Ka-
pAEG). EU-listed companies had to report their consolidated financial statements
according to the IASB standards by no later than 2005.
4.3 Stock exchange developments
During the price run-up of the 1990s, many new stock exchanges or new market
segments were created in order to float small and medium-sized firms, predom-
inantly from the high tech, internet and telecom sectors (Goergen et al. 2004). In
1997, Germany set up the Neuer Markt, one of the Euro New Markets along with
the Nieuwe Markt in Amsterdam, the Nouveau Marche´ in Paris, the Nuovo Mercado
in Milan and the EuroNM Brussels. This was an attempt to develop an IPO market
capable of competing with the American NASDAQ. Listing requirements for the
Neuer Markt included a 20% free float, a 6-month lock-in period for the incumbent
shareholders, and adherence to the Takeover Code. Also, firms listed on the Neuer
Markt had to issue a prospectus based on an international standard, follow IAS or
US-GAAP accounting rules, and report quarterly and annually (as specified in the
Rules and Regulations Neuer Markt, FWB 9).
However, although the Neuer Markt experienced a remarkable growth until 2000,
blatant violations of insider trading legislation, of lock-in agreements and share
price manipulations by several firms forced it to close down in 2002/3. The different
market segments—Amtlicher Handel (the official, most liquid market), the
Geregelter Markt (second-tier market) and the Neuer Markt—were restructured
on 1 January 2003 to form the General Standard and Prime Standard market
segments. Small and mid-sized companies, which meet minimum listing require-
ments (from the former Amtlicher Handel and the Geregelter Markt) and do not
target international investors, are now listed on the General Standard market
segment. Companies following the international accounting standards (IFRS or US
GAAP) and disclosure rules are listed on the Prime Standard segment. The Neuer
Markt firms were included in the latter.
One way of signalling firm quality and shareholder focus is by seeking a cross-
listing on a stock exchange which imposes strong shareholder protection via its
listing requirements or corporate law. While many large Continental European
companies were cross-listed in New York and London, the severe stock market crash
related to the bursting of the internet bubble in 2000 and the introduction of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US has led to a reduction of the number of cross-
listings by non-US companies and has caused a series of delistings. Litvak (2006,
2007a, b) investigates whether the act has had net costs or benefits for the
shareholders of publicly traded corporations. On the one hand, the act may benefit
shareholders by improving the monitoring of management and transforming the
broader corporate culture. On the other hand, monitoring may be best left to market
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forces and the act may needlessly impose bureaucratic burdens (see also Romano
2005; Butler and Ribstein 2006). The act applies not only to US firms, but also to
non-US firms listed with levels 2 and 3 ADRs. Litvak (2007b) finds that the
introduction of the act has had negative (lasting) effects on the share prices of foreign
cross-listed firms, the biggest losers being companies with high levels of disclosure
and those with lower needs for external financing. Given that the costs of regulatory
compliance in the UK have increased less substantially than in the US, the London
Stock Exchange has managed to attract a large share of cross-border initial public
offerings and the number of delistings has been relatively more modest.
4.4 Summary of laws, codes and stock exchange developments
A good deal of the transformations in Germany over the last decade have been on
the legal side. In particular, there have been important changes in capital market and
corporate law. The introduction of codes of best practice, however limited, has also
been an interesting innovation. All in all, there is little doubt that the institutional
setting has changed and that some of these changes have introduced Anglo-
American practices. This is clearly illustrated by the stock exchange developments.
However, some of these legislative efforts do not seem to have been accompanied
by the necessary enforcement. As a result, they have barely affected the essence of
the German corporate governance system. In fact, some even conclude that they
have actually reinforced the cornerstones of the German system (see e.g. Baums
2000; Nowak 2001; Hackethal et al. 2003; Terberger 2003; Baum 2004; Kirchmaier
and Grant 2004). The picture that emerges therefore casts doubts about the
convergence of German corporate governance towards the Anglo-American model.
5 Conclusion
Is there an optimal system of corporate governance? Will the Anglo-American
model ever become a yardstick in corporate governance? Are national governance
systems effectively converging towards a particular (ideally optimal) system of
corporate governance? These are questions that have recently attracted the attention
of researchers in both law and economics. This paper contributes to this literature by
investigating whether the German system of corporate governance is converging
towards the Anglo-American model.
We show that most features of ‘‘the stereotypical view of the German financial
system’’ are still in place. Barriers to convergence towards the Anglo-American
governance regime are: the concentrated corporate control; the separation of
ownership and control through devices such as pyramids and proxy votes; the two-
tier board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the
supervisory board that provides stability albeit possibly at the cost of entrenchment;
the important role played by banks, both directly as large shareholders and
indirectly through proxy votes and board representation; a host of institutional, legal
and even cultural barriers to hostile takeovers; and a regulatory framework based on
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EU directives but firmly rooted in the German legal doctrine. However, the German
system has also experienced some noteworthy cultural changes such as the
introduction of the principle of shareholder value and stock-based remuneration
packages. Some of its existing cornerstones, such as the market for partial corporate
control and the disciplinary effects of product market competition, also make the
German system more similar to the Anglo-American system than one would expect
at first sight. It is also interesting to note that major changes in corporate governance
practices have a legal origin. In particular, since 1995, several legislative reforms of
corporate law, and stock exchange regulation have effectively modified the
institutional framework. An interesting innovation has been the introduction of
voluntary codes (such as the Takeover Code and the Cromme Code), although the
compliance with these codes still leaves a lot to be desired.
One may argue that these new features indicate a certain trend towards a market-
oriented system. However, most of the characteristics traditionally associated with
German corporate governance (the so-called ‘‘Deutschland AG’’ or ‘‘Germany
Inc.’’) are still in place. Although the regulatory initiatives have increased
transparency and accountability, they have not addressed core competencies. As
an illustration, the Takeover Act obliges the management to take the interest of the
company at heart, but paradoxically also allows the use of anti-takeover devices.8
Although there has been some degree of convergence in terms of the adoption of
international accounting standards, improvements in stock market regulations, a
massive increase in IPOs, and the removal of multiple voting shares, the German
system still differs significantly from a market-based system.
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